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The Empirical Turn in International
Economic Law
Beth A. Simmons** and Andrew B. Breidenbach***
INTRODUCTION
In November 2010, the American Society of International
Law’s International Economic Law Interest Group (ASIL
IELIG) convened a broad cross-section of scholars,
practitioners, and students of international economic law. The
focus of this conference was International Economic Law in a
Time of Change: Reassessing Legal Theory, Doctrine,
Methodology and Policy Prescriptions. Surveying the field, we
became aware of certain swings in attitudes—from skepticism
to euphoria and back to skepticism again—toward the
empirical work that, of late, has been seeping into the
curriculum and research of legal academies. If we want to know
how the world is changing—and how our legal rules shape and
should respond to that change—empirical studies are simply
unavoidable. At the same time, the real benefit of empirical
studies is always a function of how intelligently such studies
are conceived and executed. The empirical turn in international
economic law is inevitable, but the meaning of that turn is not.
Thus, as this paper will discuss, to ensure that legal scholars
and empirical researchers are maximizing their ability to
understand and influence this time of change in international
economic law, collaboration—not distrust—between these
 This paper is adapted from the Keynote Address given by Professor Simmons
on November 18, 2010 at the American Society of International Law
International Economic Law Interest Group conference held at the University
of Minnesota Law School, “International Economic Law in a Time of Change:
Reassessing Legal Theory, Doctrine, Methodology and Policy Prescriptions.” In
this paper, the authors have deliberately adopted a tone that lies somewhere
between the strained formality of a law review article and the feigned
nonchalance of an academic address.
** Clarence Dillon Professor of International Affairs; Director, Weatherhead
Center for International Affairs, Government Department, Harvard
University.
*** J.D. candidate, May 2011, Harvard Law School; M.Sc. International
Political Economy, London School of Economics & Political Science, 2007.
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groups will be essential.
The relationship between empirical social scientists,
lawyers, and legal researchers often recalls that of Sherlock
Holmes (the “sage”) and Dr. Watson (the “know-it-all
scientist”). Sherlock Holmes and Dr. Watson were lovers of the
outdoors, so come spring one year, it was hardly surprising that
they decided to spend a weekend camping on the Sussex downs.
As night fell, they pitched their tent, put on nightshirts,
nightcaps and bed socks; and after a soothing cup of cocoa, said
a cordial goodnight and went to sleep. A few hours later, the
following conversation ensued:
Holmes nudged Watson, and said: “Watson, Watson, look at the
stars!”
“What, what?” said Watson, roused from a deep slumber. “Ah yes,
Holmes, the stars.”
“Well,” said Holmes, “what do you make of them?”
Watson, by then awake, summoned his academic training in the
scientific method and said: “Well, Holmes, judging by the position of
the stars and the moon, I deduce chronologically, that it is some three
hours since we fell asleep; geographically, that the earth has rotated
forty-five degrees during that time; astronomically, that the handle of
the big dipper is still pointing to the north star; and finally,
meteorologically, that we can expect a fine day tomorrow. Will that
do?”
“You idiot,” said Holmes. “I meant that someone has stolen our tent!”

As Holmes points out, it is sometimes necessary to look at
a situation from a broader perspective to see what is
transpiring and not just focus on the details. Like Holmes, we
will focus our attentions on the big picture: Where is the “tent”?
What is the role of international economic law in a changing
world, and how can the work of empirical social scientists
complement that of legal scholars in thinking about and
responding to that change?
I. THE EMPIRICAL TURN IN INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC LAW
We begin by defining what we mean by “empirical”
research. At the most general level, empirical research is
anything that is not purely theoretical or purely doctrinal.1
Selected anecdotes and isolated historical episodes are, in this
sense, empirical. But what we intend to focus on in this paper
is something more systematic: by “empirical” we mean a
1. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 408 (11th ed.
2003).
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systematic examination of observable phenomena from which
the researcher explicitly seeks to draw broader conclusions
about the way the world—or some part of it—works. As we
envision it here, empirical research is about trying to draw
conclusions that, to some degree, are generalizable; that is,
conclusions that apply to more than one specific historical case.
This is the kind of empiricism lawyers should care about
because, as scholars and practitioners, their professional raison
d’etre is to develop rules with broad applicability.
The empirical turn in legal scholarship generally has been
pretty well-documented.2 Indeed, there is even a law school
ranking based on institutional strength in empirical legal
studies.3 In the specific area of international economic law, the
trend is less noted, but is on the rise. A Westlaw search of the
“journals and law reviews” database shows that the number of
articles containing the term “international economic law” and
some variant of “empirical” or “statistical significance” has
increased almost six-fold since 1998.4 Almost a third of that
increase has been published in the past four years alone.5
Moreover, one of the leading international economic law
journals—the Journal of International Economic Law (JIEL),
which first went to press in 1998—is peer-reviewed,6 something
considered “quirky” in the field of law.7 Its emphasis is on
2. See generally Elizabeth Chambliss, When do Facts Persuade? Some
Thoughts on the Market for “Empirical Legal Studies,” 71 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 17 (2008); Tracey E. George, An Empirical Study of Empirical Legal
Scholarship: The Top Law Schools, 81 IND. L.J. 141 (2006); Theodore
Eisenberg, Why do Empirical Legal Scholarship?, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1741
(2004); David M. Trubek, Where the Action Is: Critical Legal Studies and
Empiricism, 36 STAN. L. REV. 575 (1984).
3. See George, supra note 2.
4. Using Westlaw’s Journals and Law Reviews (JLR) Database, the
authors conducted the following searches and obtained the following results on
January 27, 2011: (1) date(bef 1998) & “international economic law” &
“statistic! signific!” or “empiric!” – 149 results; (2) date(1998) & “international
economic law” & “statistic! signific!” or “empiric!” – 48 results; (3) date(aft
1998) & “international economic law” & “statistic! signific!” or “empiric!” – 830
results. (830 + 48) / 149 = 5.892.
5. A search of (date(aft 2005) & “international economic law” & “statistic!
signific!” or “empiric!”) returned 406 results. 1027 (the total number of results
over all years) / 406 = 2.529.
INT’L
ECON.
L.,
6. Information
for
Authors,
J.
http://www.oxfordjournals.org/our_journals/jielaw/for_authors/index.html (last
visited Jan. 28, 2011).
7. Michael J. Madison, The Idea of the Law Review: Scholarship, Prestige
and Open Access, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 901, 909 (2006) (“([A]side from a
few quirky journals) there is no peer review [of legal scholarship].”).
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studying “fundamental, long-term, systemic problems and
[offering] possible solutions, in the light of empirical
observations and experience[,]”8 and it appears well able to do
so: of the 56 members9 of the editorial board of the JIEL (which
reads like a Who’s Who of IEL scholars, many of whom were at
the conference), 30 have PhDs or SJDs, and thus are likely to
have some training in quantitative methods.10 And of the 82 or
so speakers and moderators at the conference, 32 (or 39%) have
PhDs or SJDs.11
It would be easy, of course, to overstate the significance of
these figures. For example, at the ASIL IELG Conference at
Bretton Woods in November 2006 on the state and future of the
international economic law discipline, 43% (17 of 39) of the
speakers and moderators had PhDs or SJDs—more,
percentage-wise, than at the recent conference.12 Moreover,
there is a striking contrast between the composition of the
JIEL Editorial Board and this conference—whereas there are a
good number of Economics PhDs. on the former, there were few
at the recent conference. But it is no stretch to conclude that on
top of the wealth of legal knowledge in our field, we also have a
good amount of empirical expertise. Indeed, substantial
empirical research is taking place in all types of international
economic law. International trade law continues to be the main
locus of empirical work,13 but great strides continue to be made
8. About
the
Journal,
J.
INT’L
ECON.
L.,
http://www.oxfordjournals.org/our_journals/jielaw/about.html (last visited Jan.
28, 2011).
9. This figure does not include the editorial advisory board members. See
Editorial Board, J. INT’L ECON. L., http://www.oxfordjournals.org/our_journals
/jielaw/editorial_board.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2011).
10. This number was arrived at by canvassing the resumes of the editorial
board members. Id. See also, http://www.ijiel.com/boed.htmlhttp://www.ijiel.co
m/boed.html
11. This number was arrived at by canvassing the resumes of the
conference participants, including panel members and other speakers.
Symposium, International Economic Law in a Time of Change: Reassessing
Legal Theory, Doctrine, Methodology and Policy Prescriptions Brochure (Nov.
18–20, 2010), http://asil.org/files/2010/asil_IEcLIG_brochure _111010.pdf.
12. Again, the authors canvassed the resumes of the participants at that
meeting, drawn from the schedule of proceedings, www.asil.org/pdfs/ielgconf
0606.pdf.
13. See, e.g., Juscelino F. Colares, A Theory of WTO Adjudication: From
Empirical Analysis to Biased Rule Development, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L.
383 (2009) (conducting empirical assessment of complainant win-rates at the
WTO to demonstrate that the interpretation of WTO agreements via dispute
settlement has fostered a normative free trade vision, indicating biased rule
development and some judicial lawmaking); Marc L. Busch & Krzysztof J.
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to augment doctrinal legal analysis with empirical research in
the areas of development,14 international finance and
investment,15 and international arbitration.16 Not only is the
use of empirical methodology becoming more prevalent in
international economic law, but the trend itself is becoming
increasingly self-conscious (this paper being but one such
example).17
II. WHAT CAN EMPIRICAL RESEARCH REALLY TELL US?
What do we make of this trend? And what are we likely to
learn as a result? Indeed, can we really trust empirical
researchers to “get the world right?” Admittedly, empirical
social scientists hardly have a stellar record of predicting
outcomes. In 1972, the Club of Rome published its Malthusian
Pelc, Does the WTO Need a Permanent Body of Panelists?, 12 J. INT’L ECON. L.
579 (2009) (using statistical analysis to determine, inter alia, that that rather
than constituting a permanent body of panelists, the WTO would be better
served by establishing a pool of permanent chairs); Meredith Kolsky Lewis,
The Lack of Dissent in WTO Dispute Settlement, 9 J. INT’L ECON. L. 895 (2006)
(demonstrating with empirical data that WTO dissents can and do make a
difference in WTO jurisprudence).
14. See, e.g., Michael Trebilcock & Paul-Erik Veel, Property Rights and
Development: The Contingent Case for Formalization, 30 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 397
(2008) (surveying empirical literature to argue for a reconception of the link
between property rights and development); Lee G. Branstetter, Do Stronger
Patents Induce More Local Innovation?, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 359, 359 (2004)
(demonstrating that “benefits of stronger IPRs—to the extent that they exist
at all—are more likely to come instead from an acceleration in the domestic
deployment of advanced technology by the affiliates of foreign firms.”).
15. See Gary Hufbauer & Daniel Danxia Xie, Financial Stability and
Monetary Policy: The Need for International Surveillance, 13 J. INT'L ECON. L.
939, 939 (2010) (concluding that “[e]mpirical evidence for the USA, other
[OECD] countries, and a few emerging countries lends strong support for the
connection between exceptionally fast growth of DFM [de facto money] and
subsequent financial instability.”); Panagiotis Delimatsis & Pierre Sauvé,
Financial Services Trade After the Crisis: Policy and Legal Conjectures, 13 J.
INT’L ECON. L. 837, 843–47 (2010) (suggesting empirical means to gauge the
fallout from the financial crisis); Jason Webb Yackee, Bilateral Investment
Treaties, Credible Commitment, and the Rule of (International) Law: Do BITs
Promote Foreign Direct Investment?, 42 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 805 (2008) (finding
that stronger BITs that provide access to arbitration are not associated with
increased investment).
16. See, e.g., Susan D. Franck, Empirically Evaluating Claims About
Investment Treaty Arbitration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1 (2007).
17. See INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: THE STATE AND FUTURE OF THE
DISCIPLINE (Colin B. Picker, Isabella D. Bunn & Douglas W. Arner eds., 2008)
(containing essays from a prior conference convened by the ASIL International
Economic Law Interest Group discussing the role of empirical research in
international economic law).
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treatise The Limits to Growth, in which it offered a prediction
that the world might run out of oil by 1992.18 Throughout the
1980s and early 1990s, a familiar refrain was repeatedly heard
from historians, economists and economic advisers about the
rise of Japan, the absolute and relative decline in the
competitiveness of the U.S., and the need to adopt activist
industrial policy or forever stand in the shadow of the Rising
Sun.19 In 1990, Professor John Mearsheimer forecasted the
imminent decline of NATO20 (which since his prediction has
grown from 16 members to 28)21 as well as the weakening of
the European Community22 (which, now the European Union,
has more than doubled in size, from 12 to 27 members, since
his prediction).23 As for Francis Fukuyama’s “end of history,”
since 9/11 it has been postponed indefinitely.24 And sadly,
Keynes’ vision of a leisure society—“three-hour shifts or a
fifteen hour week”25—seems increasingly fantastical. Even in
France.
When it comes to predicting outcomes, it seems the less we
empiricists know the better we do. Take, for example, the
Supreme
Court
Forecasting
Project,
“a
friendly
interdisciplinary competition to compare the accuracy of the
18. See Treading Lightly: Does Mankind Need More than One Planet?,
ECONOMIST, Sept. 19, 2002, available at http://www.economist.com/node/1337
251.
19. See generally PAUL R. KRUGMAN, POP INTERNATIONALISM (1994)
(discussing the popular concern over U.S. competitiveness and, inter alia,
comparing the myth of Asian economic growth with the reality of Japan’s more
modest recent growth rate).
20. John J. Mearsheimer, Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After
5
(1990),
available
at
the
Cold
War,
15
INT’L SECURITY
http://smp.fsv.cuni.cz/Mearsheimer.pdf.
21. See
NATO
Member
Countries,
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/nato_countries.htm (last visited Feb. 2,
2011).
22. See “The Author Replies” in Stanley Hoffmann, Robert O. Keohane &
John J. Mearsheimer, Correspondence: Back to the Future, Part II:
International Relations Theory and Post-Cold War Europe, 15 INT’L SECURITY
191 (1990), available at http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/A0015.pdf.
23. See
Member
States
of
the
EU,
http://europa.eu/abc/european_countries/eu_members/index_en.htm
(last
visited Feb. 2, 2011).
24. FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (Free
Press 2006) (1993).
25. A. J. Veal, The Elusive Leisure Society, 17–18 (University of
Technology Sydney, School of Leisure Sport and Tourism Working Paper No.
9, 2009) available at http://www.leisuresource.net/service3.aspx (follow link)
(quoting Keynes’ 1931 essay Economic Possibilities for Our Grandchildren).
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different ways in which legal experts and political scientists
assess and predict Supreme Court decision making.”26 We
cannot attest to exactly how friendly it turned out to be, but the
idea was quite intriguing: who would make the better
prediction of how the Court would decide the next Term’s cases,
statistical forecasters or constitutional law experts? The rules
of this friendly competition were as follows. The legal experts
could read anything, including past court decisions and even
the parties’ briefs.27 They could also consider extra-legal factors
if they so desired, such as the Justices’ policy preferences and
ideologies.28 The statistical model, on the other hand, was
parsimonious; it took into account only a few bits of
information, such as the ideology of the circuit court from
which the case was referred, the type of petitioner and
respondent, the type of issue and whether constitutionality was
at stake.29 Using these variables, the model coded every case
decided by the Supreme Court for the past eight terms prior to
2002—some 628 cases.30 The results: the model predicted 75%
of the 68 cases during the 2002 Term correctly.31 The legal
scholars—with their far more detailed knowledge—made
correct predictions approximately 59% of the time.32 Of
particular relevance to our present topic, the statistical model
hugely outperformed legal experts regarding economic issues
before the Supreme Court; it correctly predicted how the Court
would rule about 85% of the time.33 The legal scholars might
have done better with a coin flip; they were right just less than
half the time.34
26. See Supreme Court Forecasting Project, WASH. U. SCH. L.,
http://wusct.wustl.edu/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2011).
27. Andrew D. Martin, Kevin M. Quinn, Theodore W. Ruger & Pauline T.
Kim, Competing Approaches to Predicting Supreme Court Decision Making, 2
PERSP. ON POL. 761, 761 (2004), available at http://wusct.wustl.edu/media/ma
n1.pdf.
28. Id.
29. The statistical model took into account: “(1) the circuit of origin for the
case; (2) the issue area of the case, coded from the petitioner’s brief using
Spaeth’s protocol; (3) the type of petitioner (e.g., the United States, an injured
person, an employer); (4) the type of respondent; (5) the ideological direction of
the lower court ruling, also coded from the petitioner’s brief using Spaeth’s
protocol; and (6) whether or not the petitioner argued the constitutionality of a
law or practice” (internal footnotes removed). Id. at 762.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 763.
32. Id.
33. Martin et al., supra note 27, at 765 Figure. 3.
34. Id.
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Prediction, of course, is not understanding. We can predict
that the sun will rise tomorrow morning, but we attorneys have
not even the most basic understanding of the laws of
astrophysics. In the Supreme Court example, the empirical
social scientists involved could not have cared less about
understanding the contents of the law; they were concerned
only with predicting the outcomes of discrete cases. Not all
empirical social scientists, however, are so easily satisfied. Like
lawyers and legal scholars, they too want to understand the
law. To do so, empirical researchers have developed
increasingly sophisticated methods that allow us to analyze
broad patterns in complex legal texts, and to determine how
varied actors understand and react to the existence of and
changes in particular legal rules and institutions.
One powerful new tool allows researchers to build
computer models that “search out” not only key words in texts,
but also word clusters that take into account word-order
meaning. This sort of methodology can be a particularly useful
tool to understand very broad patterns in a very large number
of comparable documents. Professor Arthur Spirling, for
example, applies this methodology to a central issue in U.S.
history: the 600 or so treaties and other agreements negotiated
between the federal government and various Native American
tribes.35 What distinguishes these treaties over time, he finds,
is one major linguistic distinction: the harshness of the terms.36
Without having to read 600 treaties, then, Spirling finds a
systematic pattern that Native Americans’ bargaining position
deteriorated vis-à-vis the U.S. at specific times during the 19th
Century.37
One more trend in empirical legal research is also worth
mentioning, and it involves a move to the micro-level.
Increasingly, empirical researchers are interested in how law
matters to the way people behave. The problem is that real
world behavior is subject to scores of influences we social
scientists cannot control. To ameliorate this problem,
researchers increasingly are turning to surveys to find out how

35. See Arthur Spriling, Bargaining Power in Practice: US Treaty-Making
with American Indians, 1784–1911, Working Paper, Harvard University,
2010, available at http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~spirling/documents/Spir
lingPolmeth2010.pdf.
36. Id. at 30.
37. Id. at 30–31.
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people think about international law.38
As part of the Minnesota conference, we administered just
such a survey, which was distributed as participants
registered. It asked participants to give their subjective
assessment about whether one hypothetical country was a
relatively risky place to invest, and whether another
hypothetical country should be considered a good trade partner.
Not everyone received the exact same information, however;
only half of respondents were given the italicized and bracketed
information in the questions set forth below. The variation in
survey results produced by this small variation in information
proved astounding:
Question #1: We first asked participants to assess the
information provided and answer the following question: How
risky would you say it is for a manufacturing company in 2010
to invest in a country with the following characteristics?
 Has a history of capital controls, but has not interfered
with the repatriation of profits within the past year,
 Has not had a fair, competitive national election in the
past decade,
 [Has a bilateral investment treaty with an arbitration
clause with your home country],
 90% of urban areas have access to electricity 23.4 hours
per day over the past year,
 Scores well (above the global average) on the World
Bank’s “rule of law” scale,
 Has had moderate growth (4-7%) over the past decade.
Responses (participants were asked to please check
one):
_____Risk is likely to be very low
_____Risk is likely to be moderately low
_____Risk is likely to be moderately high
38. The work of Michael Tomz, who conducts empirical research in this
way and also designs software to allow other researchers to conduct such
research, is particularly important in this regard. See, e.g., Michael Tomz, The
Foundation of Domestic Audience Costs: Attitudes, Expectations, and
Institutions (Apr., 2009), in KITAI, SEIDO, GUROBARU-SHAKAI (EXPECTATIONS,
INSTITUTIONS, AND GLOBAL SOCIETY) (Masaru Kohno and Aiji Tanaka eds.,
2009), available at http://www.stanford.edu/~tomz/pubs/Tomz-AudCostFoundations-2009-04-14b.pdf. For statistical software information, see, for
example, http://politicalscience.stanford.edu/faculty/tomz.html.http://www.sta
nford.edu/~tomz/pubs/Tomz-AudCost-Foundations-2009-0414b.pdfhttp://www.stanford.edu/~tomz/pubs/Tomz-AudCost-Foundations-200904-14b.pdf.
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_____Risk is likely to be very high
Results. Even at a conference of international economic
lawyers and legal scholars, the existence or non-existence of a
bilateral investment treaty (“BIT”) was seen as very significant
to the riskiness of investment. Comparing the results of the
surveys, we observed the following:
Did not get the BIT information: Did get the BIT information:

Just by exposing respondents to the hypothetical “fact”
that a country had a BIT with the participant’s home country,
the proportion of responses that categorized the risk as
moderately to very high dropped from 31% to 21%. No one
exposed to the BIT information thought the country posed a
“very high” risk for investors. The sample size is admittedly
small, but it is interesting that we could see a ten-percentagepoint shift from a high-risk to a low-risk category with political,
policy, economic and other legal conditions held constant,
simply by changing the information about the existence of a
BIT. Thus, a not insignificant number of conference attendees
believed that the existence of such a commitment may matter
to the relative risk of an investment.
Question #2: We also asked each conference participant to
answer the following question, this time in the area of
international trade:
 How desirable would you say a country with the
following characteristics would be as a potential
partner in a new bilateral preferential trade
agreement? The country. . .
 Is a moderately-sized country classified as “upper-middle
income” by the World Bank,
 Is known currently to protect agriculture through
moderately high tariffs and modest export subsidies,
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 Is a member of the WTO,
 [Last year failed to comply with a decision of an appellate
panel regarding health and safety measures],
 Is of no particular strategic or political importance to you
or your country,
 Has had moderate growth (4-7%) over the past decade.
Responses (respondents were asked to please check
one):
_____Desirability as a candidate for a new preferential
trade agreement is likely to be very low
_____Desirability as a candidate for a new preferential
trade agreement is likely to be moderately low
_____Desirability as a candidate for a new preferential
trade agreement is likely to be moderately high
_____Desirability as a candidate for a new preferential
trade agreement is likely to be very high.
Results. Once again, there was an experimental treatment
embedded in the question: only half of participants were
exposed to the information that the country had failed to
comply with an appellate decision of the WTO in the past year.
Evidently this is unforgivable, at least in the short term, to
international economic law experts. This information alone had
a profound impact on participants’ responses, as we can see by
comparing the answers of those who received the noncompliance information with the responses of those who did
not:
Did not get the nonDid get the noncompliance information:
compliance information:

Maybe this is the result of experimenting on a conference
of international lawyers, but this time the results are extreme.
Sixty-three percent of participants thought the country would
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make a very or somewhat desirable partner for a preferential
trade agreement based on economic and political conditions,
when unaware of its recent non-compliance with an appellate
decision of the WTO. Evidently, this information is crucial,
because when it is revealed, a meager 17% of participants
thought this country would make a “somewhat desirable”
trading partner, and none thought that this country should be
considered “very desirable.” The sample group—attendants at
an ASIL IEL conference—quite clearly view non-compliance
with the WTO appellate body as a very serious matter indeed.
If this is how this group reacts to non-compliance, what might
this mean for decision-makers? While we might expect the
survey participants to weigh law violations more heavily than
the average policymaker does, the results of our experiment do
suggest that a reputation for non-compliance could have
serious consequences for new agreements down the road. In
other words, we have some evidence of why, despite its inability
to enforce its decisions, the dispute settlement mechanism of
the WTO has some bite.
Young high-tech researchers are salivating at the prospects
of converting document series into databases or conducting
surveys of elite legal actors.39 We write neither to condemn nor
condone this work—though we agree that these methods have
interesting possibilities and great risks. The risk is that, in our
excitement to “know more” and to “see further” using fancy new
techniques, we will run roughshod over genuine expertise. Any
associated downside risks will be minimized and upside payoffs
maximized only to the extent that social scientists listen
carefully to legal scholars to hone their programs and interpret
their results. Once legal scholars get over being appalled, there
will be critical ways in which their insights will help empirical
researchers who perform legal or textual analysis avoid the
most egregious errors and make the most of their work.
III. THE IMPORTANCE OF EMPIRICS IN INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC LAW
Forecasting, electronic textual analysis, experiments
embedded in surveys—these new, improving research methods
might seem useless to legal researchers. But somehow we need
39. Some of Professor Simmons’s graduate students, for example,
presently are using Arabic language programs to analyze several decades of
Egyptian clerics’ fatwas, as well as Japanese language programs to analyze
thousands of Japanese electoral platforms.
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to get a systematic understanding of the way our world
operates. How can we assess and reassess our legal theories,
doctrines and make policy prescriptions without more than a
perfunctory look at the changing world we are trying to
address? Moreover, how can we possibly talk about policy
without some idea of the conditions under which legal
innovations have “worked” in the past? David Trubek’s words
are apropos in this context: “law cannot be defined [or
evaluated] other than by the difference it makes in society, and
empirical inquiry is necessary to determine what that is.”40 It is
preposterous to imagine we can understand how law works and
how to design policy without empirical legal studies. We can
use assumptions to build models and theories, but we need
facts to build the world we want.
Make no mistake—we are all empiricists. Each of us
carries a model in his or her mind about the way the world
works: lifting trade barriers increases trade, increased trade
increases global welfare, level playing fields generate “fair”
results. Realists, in turn, would believe that states renege on
their legal agreements opportunistically and that hegemonic
law leads to unfair distributive consequences, bailouts, court
adverse selection, and moral hazard. What scholars must ask is
whether these models are “right.” Have the right lessons been
learned? A very interesting book summarizing the findings of
decades of psychology research, The Science of Fear, would
suggest we do not: people consistently overestimate the
likelihood of sensational outcomes, partly because our brains
are wired to beware of unlikely but deadly risks, but also
because the media feeds the market for disastrous news.41 As a
result, we grossly overestimate the likelihood of falling victim
to catastrophic events42 or developing breast cancer in one’s
40s.43 The “facts” many of us carry in our heads just do not
reflect the facts on the ground. Thus, we cannot simply rely on
our own understandings of the world—systematic empirical
knowledge must be substituted for biased worldviews.
This sort of cognitive bias creates acute challenges (and,
indeed, opportunities) for researchers and scholars. One scholar
has encountered some of these challenges in writing her recent
40. David M. Trubek, Where the Action Is: Critical Legal Studies and
Empiricism, 36 STAN. L. REV. 575, 581 (1984).
41. See generally DANIEL GARDNER, THE SCIENCE OF FEAR (2008).
42. Id. at 57.
43. Id. at 157–59.
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book about the positive impact that the ratification of
multilateral human rights agreements has had on domestic
politics, litigation, and demands on human rights outcomes.44
In short, her empirical research shows that, in some cases,
governments that have ratified the Convention Against Torture
(CAT) or the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) actually do reduce torture, allow religious
freedom, and provide fair trials more than comparable
countries that have not ratified such treaties.45 Why are
complex quantitative and qualitative methodologies needed to
demonstrate this convincingly? Because it is somewhat hard to
believe. These findings cut against the biased information we
are fed each day: News headlines scream “torture of Iraqi
detainees by the Iraqi authorities,” using electrocution, electric
drills, and even execution,46 or reveal images of abuse by
Indian officers of youth in Kashmir.47 We never see headlines
about CAT ratifiers that proclaim: “Niger Eschews Torture” or
“Way to Go Uruguay!” so we conclude that it is naive to think
that any of the treaties lawyers have carefully crafted over the
last several decades could possibly be effective; we must be
wasting our time.
Biases pervade international investment law as well. Pick
up (or, more likely, navigate to) a mainstream financial news
source, and we read about the progress of the growing network
of bilateral investment treaties in protecting foreign
investments—to everyone’s advantage. Recently, the Wall
Street Journal glowed with enthusiasm for a U.S.-India BIT.
High on Obama’s to-do list in India, declared one op-ed, should
be “seek[ing] a broad expansion of bilateral trade and
investment, beginning with a long-delayed Bilateral
Investment Treaty.”48 Another article put it thus: “Now the
44. See, e.g., BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 273
(2009).
45. See id.
46. See Huge Wikileaks Release Shows US ‘Ignored Iraq Torture’, BBC
NEWS (23 October 2010, 05:42AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middleeast-11611319; see also WIKILEAKS, www.wikileaks.org (last visited Jan.26,
2011).
47. See Indian Authorities Must Investigate Online Video of Kashmir
Detainee Abuse, AMNESTY INT’L (September 12, 2010), http://www.amnesty.org
/en/news-and-updates/indian-authorities-must-investigate-online-videokashmir-detainee-abuse-2010-09-13.
48. Richard L. Armitage & R. Nicholas Burns, A To-Do List for Obama in
India, WSJ.COM (November 4, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424
052702304155604575581721120234484.html.
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question is how quickly commercial cooperation can move
forward, and whether traditional barriers to cross-border
investment can be removed.”49 The Economist Intelligence
Unit, reporting on Ecuador’s recent decision to “tear up” a
number of its bilateral investment treaties as violative of its
national Constitution, stated that “[t]he government’s decision
to pull out of investment treaties comes at a time when some
officials have been seeking to improve perceptions of Ecuador’s
business climate and will deter foreign investment.”50
Systematic empirical research provides a quite different
picture. Overall, research suggests that the ability of BITs to
attract foreign direct investment is minimal.51 The studies that
find some positive effects to BIT ratification caution that BITs
are beneficial in countries that already have strong property
protection regimes in place. In explaining the rush to negotiate
and ratify BITs in the 1980s and 1990s, Jose Alvarez wrote a
fascinating account based on his State Department experience
during the height of the BITs-signing frenzy. Developing
countries often entered into BITs without much of an
understanding about the legal consequences.52 This is
consistent with the empirical work that was conducted with
Andrew Guzman and Zachary Elkins on the pattern of BIT
signings over time. Using a statistical model to analyze the
probability that any two states would conclude a BIT
agreement, the study found patterns that suggested the BIT
cascade of the 1980s and 1990s was a competitive scramble by
developing countries to impress on creditor nations that the
latter’s investment will be secure.53 As evidence, developing
countries tended to ratify BITs when those countries with the
49. Amol Sharma, Five Ways U.S.-India Trade can Improve, THE WALL
ST. J. (November 2, 2010), http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2010/11/02/fiveways-us-india-trade-can-improve/.
50. Ecuador Economy: Bilateral Investment Protection Treaties Torn Up,
ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT (Sep. 27, 2010), http://www.eiu.com/index.asp
?layout=VWArticleVW3&article_id=77456592&region_id=&country_id=17900
00179&channel_id=190004019&category_id=500004050&refm=vwCat&page_t
itle=Article&rf=0.
51. See José E. Alvarez, The Return of the State, 20 MINN. J. INT’L L.
(forthcoming 2011).
52. See id.
53. See Zachary Elkins, Andrew Guzman & Beth Simmons, Competing for
Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960–2000, in THE
BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: PERCEPTIONS AND REALITY
369 (Michael Waibel, Asha Kaushal, Kyo-Hwa Liz Chung & Claire Balchin
eds., 2010).
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most similar product profile, the most similar infrastructure,
and the most similar workforces (i.e., their closest competitor
nations) did so.54 To this, one might add a degree of economic
desperation; Professor Simmons is doing some work that
reveals that developing countries were much more likely to
ratify BITs during periods of economic downturn. Evidence that
BITs actually attract significant foreign direct investment is
weak at best.55 There is little doubt about what they
systematically do attract: international arbitration. The more
BITs a country signs, the more likely they are to show up on
the list of cases on the International Center for Settlement of
Investment Disputes website. It is no wonder, then, that
developing as well as developed countries are having second
thoughts about BITs, insisting on renegotiation, declaring
moratoria on new agreements, and, in some cases, even
terminating existing agreements. We have also seen a recent
spike in desperate attempts at arbitration award annulments.56
The empirical work that tries to “take the pulse” of the legal
regime for protection of FDI suggests that the patient is not all
that well.
And yet the fanfare continues. Even if researchers might
know that, as an empirical matter, BITs rarely meet their
stated goals, practitioners—politicians and businesses, in
particular—still believe otherwise. Associations of American
54. Id.
55. See, e.g., Jason W. Yackee, Do Bilateral Investment treaties Promote
Foreign Direct Investment? Some Hints from Alternative Evidence, 51 VA. J.
INT'L L. 397, 434 (2011). (conducting empirical analysis to conclude that
“[w]hile BITs are routinely described as important tools for attracting FDI,
and while certain empirical studies claim to have isolated huge causal
impacts, my own examination suggests that, at best, BITs spur investment
only irregularly, inconsistently, and with generally unassuming impact”);
Emma Aisbett, Bilateral Investment Treaties and Foreign Direct Investment:
Correlation Versus Causation, in THE EFFECTS OF TREATIES ON FOREIGN
DIRECT INVESTMENT, 395 (Karl P. Sauvant & Lisa E. Sachs eds., 2009)
(identifying a number of serious methodological challenges largely ignored in
BIT studies, including problems of endogeneity, autocorrelation, and omitted
variables; finding that once these problems were addressed using appropriate
statistical methods, significant correlations between BIT ratification and FDI
inflows disappeared); U.N. Conf. on Trade & Dev., Bilateral Investment
Treaties in the Mid-1990s, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/7, 105 (1998).
(concluding that BITs could be expected to “marginally increase” foreign direct
investment, but such an effect is usually small).
56. See Christina Knahr, Annulment and Its Role in the Context of
Conflict Awards, in THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT ARBITRATION:
PERCEPTIONS AND REALITY 151, 151 (Michael Waibel, Asha Kaushal, KyoHwa Liz Chung & Claire Balchin eds., 2010).
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businesses regularly call for the U.S. to negotiate BITs,
particularly with Brazil, Russia, India, and China (where the
bulk of foreign direct investment already goes).57 Also, when
BIT talks with China were announced in June of 2008, for
example, “American business interests reacted positively” to
the news.58 Enthusiasm is not limited to the developed world—
developing countries continue to negotiate BITs amongst
themselves and with the North.
In this time of crisis and change, researchers are
inundated with sensationalized and unsophisticated accounts
of the world. It is, therefore, particularly important that as we
try to sort out what has happened and how to move forward, we
do so with the strongest empirical basis we can. Reactionary
policies grounded in sensational views of the recent crisis are
the likely result of a failure to merge empirical research with
legal reform.
IV. LINKING EMPIRICS WITH LAW AND POLICY
This takes us to the heart of the matter—in what ways
does empirical research help international economic lawyers
and legal scholars in their capacities as policy makers? Two
avenues, distinct but intimately related, immediately come to
mind.
First and foremost, empirical studies give researchers the
ability to systematically evaluate legal institutions in light of
their goals. As discussed briefly above, researchers proceeding
empirically have confirmed that the energies and resources
expended on negotiating and ratifying multilateral treaties
about trade and human rights, for example, are not for
naught—these legal texts do promote many of their stated
goals.59 One of the first systematic treatments by Andrew Rose,
a professor in the business school at UC Berkeley, came to
what for many was a surprising and highly counterintuitive
conclusion: he found little evidence that countries joining or
belonging to the GATT/WTO have different trade patterns from
57. See Bush Urged to Pursue BRIC Pacts, GLOBE & MAIL (Dec. 5, 2007),
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/bush-urged-to-pursue-bri
c-pacts/article139409/.
58. See Steven R. Weisman, U.S. and China Agree to Ease Foreign
Investment, NY TIMES (Jun. 06, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/19/bus
iness/worldbusiness/19trade.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=US%20and%20China%20a
gree%20to%20ease%20foreign%20investment%202008&st=cse.
59. See SIMMONS, supra note 44.
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outsiders, though the Generalized System of Preferences seems
to have a strong effect.60 Empirical work of this kind is
wonderfully provocative, and scholars got to work to determine
whether Rose’s findings were robust. Empirical political
scientists Judith Goldstein, Michael Tomz, and Doug Rivers
looked at the way “members” were coded in Rose’s study and
found that there were actually lots of countries who were not
full members (and therefore not coded as such in Rose’s
dataset), but had formally been extended all the benefits of
membership.61 After reflecting in the data that these states do
in fact “participate” in the regime, Goldstein and her
collaborators found a strong and positive effect to the
liberalizing rules of the GATT/WTO.62 In another study,
however, examining the distributive consequences of
international economic law, Subramanian and Wei found that
the WTO promotes trade strongly but unevenly.63 If we were
sure it was otherwise, it would be high time to determine where
else to focus our attention. This might be the case in the BIT
context, where there are certainly questions about whether the
BIT regime has achieved its goals.64
As an obvious corollary, empirical research might give us
reason to support the revision of our legal rules. Consider
Article 28(2) of the GATT, which allows developing countries to
implement infant-industry protections.65 Empirical data has
somewhat consistently shown that infant-industry protections
do not work to spur long-term growth or development.66 If the
60. Andrew Rose, Do We Really Know that the WTO Increases Trade?, 94
AM. ECON. REV. 98, 98 (Mar. 2004).
61. See Judith Goldstein, Douglas Rivers & Michael Tomz, Do We Really
Know That the WTO Increases Trade? Comment, 97 AM. ECON. REV. 2005,
2005 (Dec. 2007).
62. Id.
63. See Arvind Subramanian & Shang-Jin Wei, The WTO Promotes Trade,
Strongly but Unevenly, 72 J. INT’L ECON. 151 (2007).
64. See Alvarez, supra note 51.
65. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/g
att47_02_e.htm (stating that parties implement protective or other measures
such as flexibility in their tariff structure, grant tariff protection and
quantitative restrictions for balance of payments purposes).
66. See, e.g., Howard Pack, Industrial Policy: Growth Elixir or Poison?, 15
WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 47, 48, 60 (2000) (surveying past empirical
evidence disparaging import-substitution and conducting survey to determine
in part that industrial policy in Japan and Korean at most “may have been a
minor hormone.”); Steven Radelet & Jeffrey Sachs, Asia’s Reemergence,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Nov./Dec. 1997, at 51 (Some modest infant-industry
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goals of the WTO are to promote trade liberalization, global
welfare and development, the disconnect between empirics and
reality might appear disconcerting.
Second, empirical studies provide facts on which to base
legal doctrine and public policy. The most famous example of
this in American law is probably footnote 11 in Brown v. Board
of Education, where the U.S. Supreme Court cited to social
psychology studies to support its conclusion that “separate but
equal” segregated educational facilities are inherently
unequal.67 Certainly doing so was not necessary to the Court’s
analysis—it could have relied on the moral and doctrinal
judgment that discrimination per se is injurious—but the
persuasive power of such research is at times undeniable.
In the area of international trade, it is becoming clear that
legal structures and processes are having important impacts on
outcomes—and that we should remember these lessons when
considering how these agreements might be modified in the
future. An important body of empirical work by a number of
international trade scholars—beginning in earnest with Robert
Hudec—determined that developing countries, particularly
Least Developed Countries, initiated GATT/WTO disputes
significantly less frequently than they “should,” and even then
garnered only mixed results in trade litigation.68 Especially
successes have been noted in large countries, though balanced by high costs,
and its record elsewhere “is one of almost unremitting failure”); Anne O.
Krueger & Baran Tuncer, An Empirical Test of the Infant Industry Argument,
72 AM. ECON. REV. 1142, 1142 (1982).
67. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954); see also Edmond
Cahn, Jurisprudence, 1955 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 655, 655–58 (1955) (discussing
the meaning and dangers of footnote 11).
68. See MARC L. BUSCH & ERIC REINHARDT, Developing Countries and
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization Dispute
Settlement, 37 J. WORLD TRADE 719, passim (2003) (demonstrating empirically
that the WTO “only serves to reinforce th[e] tendency [of developing countries
to exact few concessions from defendants in trade litigation], given both the
incentives to litigate as well as developing countries’ lack of capacity to push
for early settlement.”); Robert E. Hudec et al., A Statistical Profile of GATT
Dispute Settlement Cases: 1948–1989, 2 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 6 (1993);
see also Andrew T. Guzman & Beth A. Simmons, Power Plays and Capacity
Constraints: The Selection of Defendants in World Trade Organization
Disputes, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 557 (2005) (conducting an empirical analysis of
disputing behavior in the GATT and concluding that poorer countries chose
their targets strategically so as to conserve their legal and other resources,
thus choosing only the biggest targets, and only initiating disputes rarely); see
generally Marc L. Busch & Eric Reinhardt, Testing International Trade Law:
Empirical Studies of GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement, in THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ROBERT E.
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troubling was Marc Busch’s revelation that LDCs were onethird less likely to file complaints against developed states
under the WTO than they were under the post-1989 GATT
regime.69 This research also pointed to reasons for this trend:
the WTO’s increased legal and procedural complexity resulted
in higher costs and required greater legal capacity.70 Most
striking are not these conclusions, which developing countries
and their advocates already knew well,71 but their results—
these findings gave credence to calls from developing countries
for the establishment of an Advisory Centre on WTO Law (the
Advisory Centre), which was finally formed in 2001.72 The
Advisory Centre’s “mission is to provide developing countries
and LDCs with the legal capacity necessary to enable them to
take full advantage of the benefits and opportunities offered by
the WTO.”73 After the better part of a decade, the Advisory
Centre has assisted developing countries initiate some 19
complaints—the same number of complaints that the U.S. itself
initiated in the same time period.74
HUDEC 457, 466–68 (Daniel L. M. Kennedy & James D. Southwick eds., 2002)
(explaining why LDCs are not as active in the WTO dispute settlement
system).
69. Eric Reinhardt, Aggressive Multilateralism: The Determinants of
GATT/WTO Dispute Initiation, 1948–1998, EMORY UNIVERSITY, 15–21 (Feb.
16, 2000), userwww.service.emory.edu/~erein/research/initiation.pdf.
70. See Marc L. Busch & Eric Reinhardt, Testing International Trade
Law: Empirical Studies of GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement, in THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ROBERT E.
HUDEC 457, 467 (Daniel L. M. Kennedy & James D. Southwick eds., 2002)
(noting the various reasons put forward by empirical researchers to explain
under-participation by developing countries under-participation in WTO
dispute settlements).
71. See Kim Van der Borght, The Advisory Center on WTO Law:
Advancing Fairness and Equality, 2 J. INT’L ECON. L. 723, 724–26 (1999)
(describing various developing country proposals for a capacity-building
institution and advocating its creation).
72. See The Agreement Establishing the Advisory Centre on WTO Law,
Dec. 1, 1999, available at http://www.acwl.ch/e/documents/agreement_establis
hing.pdf (noting in its opening preamble that “developing countries, in
particular the least developed among them, and the countries with economies
in transition have limited expertise in WTO law and the management of
complex trade disputes and their ability to acquire such expertise is subject to
severe financial and institutional constraints . . . .”).
73. The
ACWL’s
Mission,
ADVISORY CTR. ON WTO LAW,
http://www.acwl.ch/e/about/about_us.html (last visited February 1, 2011).
74. Advisory Ctr. on WTO Law, Report on Operations: 2009, 8 (2009)
(emphasis added), available at http://www.acwl.ch/e/about/reports.html
(“[B]etween 2001 and 2008, the [Advisory Centre] (nineteen times) has worked
legally on behalf of the complainant members in more disputes than any WTO
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Consider as well the rise and fall of Strategic Trade Policy
(STP). In the 1980s, a group of economists—Nobel Prize winner
Paul Krugman among them—developed a powerful theoretical
critique of comparative advantage in high-technology
industries characterized by increasing returns to scale. Always
provocative, Krugman at first questioned whether free trade
had become passé,75 but when he saw his theories being coopted by protectionist policy-makers he was relentless in
demanding thorough empirical research before making this
theory operational.76 In the U.S. at least, the push for STP has
diminished, and seemingly for the best: aside from the complex
political economy problems posed by STP, empirical research
on each major attempt at STP has shown that the policy
imposed net costs each time.77 The STP saga demonstrates the
limits of theoretical models (and reactionary policy-making)
and the importance of empirical study to effectively translate
theory into policy and practice.
Recent BITs research is also instructive. Notwithstanding
the problems with BITs, researchers Tobin and Busch recently
analyzed annual data on pairs of developing and developed
countries between 1960 and 2004, concluding that BITs raise
the prospects of getting a North-South preferential trade
agreement, at least up to a point.78 Thus, we might encourage
negotiation of BITs as an indirect way to increase trade and
investment flows. Viewed in this light, the recent commentary
member acted as a complainant in its own disputes except for the United
States (also nineteen times) and the EC (twenty-one times). Put differently, if
the ACWL were not an intergovernmental organization but instead were itself
a WTO member country, it would be considered as the third most frequently
active complainant litigant.”).
75. Paul R. Krugman, Is Free Trade Passé?, 1 J. ECON. PERSP. 131, 131
(1987).
76. See generally Krugman, supra note 17.
77. See id. at 113; Paul R. Krugman, Making Sense of the Competitiveness
Debate, 12 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 17, 23–24 (1996) (contrasting the
“punditry on the semiconductor industry” with the realities of intervention in
that sector); See generally Wilfred J. Ethier, Modern International Economics
274–767 (3rd ed. 1995) (describing European and Japanese semiconductor
policies); PAUL KRUGMAN & ALASDAIR SMITH, Introduction, in EMPIRICAL
STUDIES OF STRATEGIC TRADE POLICY 1, 7 (1994) (“It is also true that the
research generally provides little support for a drastic rethinking of trade
policy. Nobody has yet provided empirical evidence that would suggest large
gains from protection or export subsidy.”).
78. Jennifer L. Tobin & Marc L. Busch, A BIT is Better Than a Lot:
Bilateral Investment Treaties and Preferential Trade Agreements, 62 WORLD
POL. 1, 31 (2010).
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on the occasion of Obama’s trip to India may not seem so
flawed.79
Empiricism, of course, is just one tool in the woodshed.
Legal institutions are political compromises between competing
goals, not real-world manifestations of state-of-the-art
statistical analysis. Although empirical methodologies are
important in discovering how our legal institutions operate and
how they impact our world, we cannot begin to truly
understand them simply by running regressions. In translating
empirics into policy, the role of the lawyer, the political
economist, and the politician are paramount, given their
intimate knowledge of the institutional and normative
constraints that operate on the ground. Thus, even if some
empirical studies demonstrate the weakness of the theories
underlying particular international economic laws, we might
not actually expend resources on their revision for a number of
reasons—in the infant-industry context, for example, because
of what Article 28(b) represents to developing countries: the
recognition of their historical experience and the importance of
policy space as a general principle.80 Thus, when we are
evaluating our world and the legal institutions that create it,
empirical studies are undeniably important, but they can never
tell the whole story.
CONCLUSIONS
The ASIL IELG brought scholars together to understand
and influence a time of change in international economic law.
This is no easy task, and will require in-depth study by
researchers from a broad range of disciplines. It is our firm
belief that an important—indeed, an indispensable—tool of
international economic law going forward will be systematic
empirical research. Given its unique nexus with economics,
political economy, international relations, and domestic and
international law, the empirical turn in international economic
law is no coincidence, and should be embraced. We do not mean
to argue that it is essential for legal scholars to run out and get
a Ph.D. in statistics or economics or social science. In most
79. See supra notes 41–42 and accompanying text.
80. John Ruggie might describe this as a manifestation of “embedded
liberalism.” See John Gerard Ruggie, International Regimes, Transactions,
and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order, 36 INT’L
ORG 379, 379–80 (1982).
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cases that would be an utter waste of a lawyer’s time and
training. One does not need a Ph.D. in social sciences to make
appropriate use of empirical research—one only needs a friend
or colleague with empirical training. Interdisciplinary
collaboration unlocks synergies; this is the university’s version
of comparative advantage.
Notwithstanding increases in the amount of empirical
international economic law research and advances in the
quality of empirical methodologies, however, controversy
remains as to whether the empirical trend is a good thing for
the study of international economic law. On the one hand, there
are those who push back on empiricism’s own terms. What does
this empirical data actually tell us? Why is it important? Are
the conclusions robust, and why do social scientists turn up so
many inconsistent answers? Everyone should be asking these
questions of empirical research—this is not a sore spot felt by
the legal academy alone.
But we sense the anxieties among some legal scholars run
deeper. Some are concerned that empirical research is not, and
certainly should not be, what the legal academy is all about.
Social science and legal scholarship are distinct enterprises
with inherently different purposes, it is easy to believe, and
each discipline is taught to put its intellectual firepower to
different use. Science is always a hypothesis from which we can
advance in the face of better evidence or more convincing
theory. The key is absolute transparency in data methods—
publicness and replicability are primary values. As Keynes
famously wrote in his 1933 Essays in Biography, “There is no
harm in being sometimes wrong—especially if one is promptly
found out.”81 (Which, to our occasional embarrassment, we all
can potentially be!) More important than the “stance” a
researcher takes today is her commitment to the scientific
process, to the treatment of data as public goods. Social
scientists can critique, bicker, and collaborate, but we don’t
have to settle anything by the end of the day. The normal
science model is all about edging toward the truth in the long
run, and generally doing so in a cooperative, as opposed to
adversarial, way.
Legal scholars are trained to use their intellectual skills
differently: to make the best case to win the point. At the end of
the day, a decision must be taken in a case or a policy must be
81. JOHN MAYNARD KEYES, ESSAYS IN BIOGRAPHY 317 (W.W. Norton & Co., Inc.
1933).
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chosen and implemented. The need to decide pushes legal
scholars into their respective positions. The pressure of a
decision also makes legal scholars less tolerant of ambiguity
and uncertainty, both of which are rife in the “scientific”
enterprise. Social scientists draw conclusions with varying
degrees of certainty, measured by confidence intervals, but
advocates cannot be wafflers. Lee Epstein and Gary King aptly
described the nature of the problem thus: “An attorney who
treats a client like a hypothesis would be disbarred; a Ph.D.
who advocates a hypothesis like a client would be ignored.”82
This viewpoint overstates the gulf between social scientists
and lawyers to some extent. As our opening tale about Holmes
and Watson suggests, and as we have intended to convey, there
undoubtedly are important synergies that can be achieved via
partnerships between legal scholars and empirical researchers.
Of particular benefit to lawyers, the factual groundwork to
evaluate legal institutions and formulate policy prescriptions
will be better laid. For empirical researchers, the benefits are
immense as well: lawyers and legal scholars can focus us on
questions that actually need answering, can help us
understand why things are the way they are and what
possibilities there are for the future, and are the conduits by
which data and doctrine are translated into policy. At the most
fundamental level, moreover, empirical researchers and
lawyers are engaged in the same impossible task: a search for
the truth. By working together, international economic lawyers
and empirical researchers can focus on the most important
variables and the most important questions—while using legal
scholars’ doctrinal, philosophical, and public policy knowledge
to confirm and explain empirical findings—thereby improving
the process by which data is accumulated and distributed. This,
in turn, will increase the value of empirical research to
international economic lawyers. There is hope yet that we can
see eye to eye, and in doing so, improve our vision.
We hope that our readers—lawyers and legal scholars in
particular—will consider the extent to which their work
depends upon empirical claims about our world. We find
ourselves in a period of crisis and change—consider too
whether we are relying on sensationalized worldviews in
formulating our beliefs and policies. And consider, finally, the
comparative advantages you possess in analyzing your world.
82. Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1,
7 (2002).
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The possibilities for collaboration are many, and we should all
think about whether it would enrich our scholarship to work
together to an even greater degree than we already have.

